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Recommendation-based Trust Model for
Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
Aljawharah Alnasser, Hongjian Sun, Senior Member, IEEE and Jing Jiang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is one of
the main systems which have been developed to achieve safe
traffic and efficient transportation. It enables the vehicles to
establish connections with other road entities and infrastructure
units using Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications. As a
consequence, all road entities become exposed to either internal
or external attacks. Internal attacks cannot be detected by
traditional security schemes. In this paper, a recommendation-
based trust model for V2X communications is proposed to
defend against internal attacks. Four types of malicious attacks
are analysed. In addition, we conduct various experiments
with different percentage of malicious nodes to measure the
performance of the proposed model. In comparison with the
existing model, the proposed model shows an improvement in
the network throughput and the detection rate for all types of
considered malicious behaviors. Our model improves the Packet
Dropping Rate (PDR) with 36% when the percentage of malicious
nodes is around 87.5%.
Index Terms—Trust, V2X, Recommendation, Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE transportation industry has received a massiveevolution during the last few years. The automotive
companies have worked on combining hardware and software
into their vehicles to make them smarter. Thus, the vehicles
become able to communicate and interact with the surrounding
environment. Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is the
key enabler of smart cities where the communication is
supported between road entities such as buses, pedestrians,
motorcycles and cycles, which is called Vehicle-to-Everything
(V2X) communication.
V2X supports a unified connectivity platform for the
road entities. Each road entity is able to share information
such as speed, direction, and location with the surrounding
entities. In case of sudden events such as accidents or
congestion, an alarm message is sent to warn the neighboring
entities. The communication type depends on the entities that
establish the link. V2X supports five types of communications
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which are Vehicle-to-Sensors, Vehicle-to-Vehicle, Vehicle-to-
Pedestrian, Vehicle-to-Grid and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure [1].
The interoperability among heterogeneous devices is one of the
main challenges in V2X communication. As a consequence,
3GPP group released LTE protocol (Release 14) to support
V2X services.
Indeed, static users have more stable connection and static
network topology. On the other hand, mobile nodes have
challenge in choosing next hop where the network topology
is frequently changed. Also, the communication time between
road entities is limited. The ad-hoc link between road entities
is more exposed to external or internal attacks than the cellular
connection because it is not managed by the Core Network
(CN) [2]. External attacks are initiated by unauthorized nodes
in the network. It could happen when two entities are located
out of the network coverage; then, there is a possibility of
communicating with a revoked entity. Internal attacks are
launched by authorized nodes which have valid credentials.
Indeed, internal attackers break through some traditional
security measures such as cryptography and authentication
[3][4] because the road entity is usually authenticated but
users can tamper with the nodes for malicious activities
[5]. In addition, transaction messages must be protected and
forwarded directly to the CN because they have personal
and confidential data [6]. Also, they could be sent through a
multihop route to the CN. However, the relaying node could be
an internal attacker that stops the packets forwarding process.
Therefore, it affects the network performance adversely.
As a consequence, a trust-based model was suggested
to detect internal attackers by monitoring the neighbors'
behavior and collecting information about them [3]. Then,
this information could be sent to other neighbors as a
recommendation or to central units as an alarm. Recently,
some researchers designed trust models for vehicular networks
to build up trust relationships among nodes. For instance,
Chuang and Lee [7] applied trust model as an authentication
scheme where the vehicle is considered trusted when it is
successfully authenticated. However, the model is able to
detect external attackers only. In addition, Shen et al. [8]
implemented a message authentication scheme where some
vehicles are known as verifiers. The verifier vehicles check
the validity of the received messages and send their decisions
to non-verifier vehicles to guide them for accepting or rejecting
the message. In addition, the proposed framework in [9]
provided three security measures to ensure the message's
trustworthiness. It checks that the message was generated
from a trusted location and followed a trusted path. Also,
it checks the validity of the message's content. Mrmola and
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Prezb [10] designed a security model that works on detecting
selfish nodes that transmit false or bogus messages. The model
defined a fuzzy set to classify each node with three different
trust levels. Based on the source node trustworthiness level,
the receiver can decide whether it has to receive, forward or
drop it. In these solutions, the node can only make a decision
when there is a previous communication with the considered
node. However, this is not the case in vehicular network where
there is always high chance for meeting new nodes.
To address new nodes problem, recommendation-based
trust model was suggested where the decision is based
on direct interactions and the received recommendations.
However, in some cases, the compromised node sends a
fake recommendation regarding a normal node or other
malicious node. As a result, adding recommendation filtering
phase to the trust model was developed to ignore dishonest
recommendations. For instance, Hu et al. [11] suggested a
recommendation-based trust model for choosing a trusted
node as a platoon head. They took various trust attacks into
consideration such as bad-mouthing, newcomers, and on-off
attacks. It is a centralized model where all trust values and
feedback regarding their trips are sent to Road Side Units
(RSUs). However, the accuracy decreases in the areas where
there is no RSUs. Furthermore, Zhou et al. [12] applied
trust model as a security authentication method. Based on the
computed trust value, the node is granted the access to the
network. The model is composed of two trust components:
direct trust and indirect trust. However, the node only ignores
the fake recommendations that are sent by nodes with low
trust values. Also, Ahmed and Tepe [13] implemented a trust
model to identify and ignore malicious recommendations.
The model included a similarity model to determine whether
the recommendation is true or not. The evaluating node
computes the similarity between its opinion and the received
recommendations. The main drawback of this model is that
the node cannot measure the similarity when it does not have
an opinion regarding that node. Thus, it should have direct
interaction with that node to be able to provide its opinion.
To overcome some of these limitations, this paper proposes
a distributed recommendation-based trust model for protecting
direct links in the V2X network. The node can make a
decision independently and detect malicious nodes prior to
interactions. In addition, the proposed model is able to ignore
the dishonest recommendations that are generated by highly
trusted nodes. Furthermore, we study the impact of non-stable
malicious behavior on the proposed model. Also, we analyse
the performance of the proposed model in comparison with
the existing model in [14]. In brief, the main contributions of
this paper are:
1) This paper proposes a recommendation-based trust
model for V2X communication. Different from existing
research, it is a distributed model that targeting at non-
stable malicious behavior.
2) Adaptive weights are applied in the recommendation
filtering process. The weights are changed based on
the number of positive and negative recommendations.
Thus, the effect of the recommendation attacks is
reduced.
3) This paper compares the performance of the proposed
model with the existing model in [14]; our model
improves the Packet Dropping Rate (PDR) with 36%
when the percentage of malicious nodes is around
87.5%.
The paper is organised as follow. Section II proposes the
system model for the V2X network. Section III illustrates
the proposed trust model. Section IV shows the simulation
analysis for the proposed model. Section V provides
theoretical analysis for the proposed model. Section VI
presents the comparison results with the existing model.
Finally, Section VII summarises the overall work performed.
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
A. The considered network
The considered network is a vehicular network which
consists of N road entities. The road entities move at random
speeds through a dedicated route. Here, we use "node" and
"road entity" interchangeably for the same meaning. The
transaction message is sent to the CN for further analysis. In
the relay coverage scenario, the communication between two
road entities is established when one of them is located out
of network coverage. The communication forms a multi-hop
route to deliver the packets to the CN. We consider two types
of nodes as follows:
1) Normal node: It keeps monitoring the surrounding
environment and sends its packets to the CN. Also, it relays
any received packets to the nearest RSU.
2) Malicious node: In the considered scenario, the relaying
nodes could be compromised nodes that launch the following
attacks:
• Routing attacks which affect the packet routing such as
Blackhole attack where the compromised node drops all
of the received packets [15]; and Greyhole attack where
the compromised node drops some of the received packets
[16].
• Recommendation attacks where the compromised nodes
send fake recommendations to destroy trust decision [17]
such as Bad-mouthing attack where the malicious node
sends a negative recommendation regarding a normal
node; and Good-mouthing attack where the malicious
node sends a positive recommendation regarding a
malicious node.
Moreover, the malicious node could behave in various
patterns which are:
• Stable malicious behavior: where the malicious node
behaves maliciously in continuous manner.
• Non-stable malicious behavior: where the malicious node
behaves normally and maliciously in an alternative way.
The malicious node changes its behavior with a group of
neighbors or during different time periods. Considering
this types of attackers is very important because they can
gain high trust value [18].
B. System model
Each time the road entity has information to send to the
CN, it should go through four phases as follows:
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1) Network coverage phase: Each node continuously
checks its connectivity with the CN and other nodes.
2) Communication phase: If the source node has a direct
link to the CN, it sends the packet directly through the
network. Otherwise, the source node sends its packets to a
trusted relaying node.
3) Trust calculation phase: During trust period, each node
computes the trust value for neighboring nodes. This phase is
explained in details in the following Section.
4) Decision phase: Each node has a local blacklist which
contains all untrusted neighboring nodes.
III. RECOMMENDATION-BASED TRUST MODEL FOR V2X
The proposed model is designed to protect V2X
communication against internal attacks. Trust calculations are
executed in a distributed manner using weighted-sum method.
Building on a comprehensive review in [2], we found that
weighted sum and fuzzy logic are the most common methods
to measure trustiness in vehicular networks. Furthermore, in
our previous work [19], we proposed a comparison between
the trust methods for the vehicular network scenario. These
results showed that the weighted-sum is more efficient than
fuzzy logic.
The trust calculation includes two main trust components
as follows:
A. Current Trust - T (t)c(i,j)
It is an evaluation of the direct interaction between node i
and node j during the time interval t. It is a combination of
direct trust and past trust. It is computed using
T
(t)
c(i,j) =
T
(t)
p(i,j) + T
(t)
d(i,j)
2
(1)
where T (t)p(i,j) is the past trust measure of node i regarding
node j, and T (t)d(i,j) is the direct trust value between node i
and node j. The past trust has the same importance as direct
trust because we study the impact of non-stable malicious
behaviour where past behaviour should be considered. As
the compromised node could behave normally in the current
time interval (high direct trust), however, it made malicious
behaviour during the previous interval (low past trust). Here
is the detailed description:
1) Past trust - T (t)p(i,j): It is a measure of the historical
behavior of each node j. Indeed, smart attackers behave
normally and maliciously sequentially to escape from the
punishment. As a result, considering the past behavior of node
j is recommended. It is calculated by
T
(t)
p(i,j) = T
(t−∆)
g(i,j) (2)
where ∆ is the time between two consecutive trust intervals,
and Tg(i,j) is the global trust value during the previous trust
interval (t−∆).
2) Direct trust - T (t)d(i,j): Node i computes the direct trust
of its one-hop neighboring nodes j which is based on the
direct interactions between them. Thus, it is calculated only
when there is direct communication between node i and node
j at time t. During the interaction, node i collects information
regarding the sent packets and whether node j relayed them
or not. Therefore, it uses the collected information to compute
the direct trust value which represents the forwarding packet
rate during the time interval t. It is calculated using
T
(t)
d(i,j) =
Successful_Interactions
Total_Interactions
(3)
B. Indirect Trust - T (t)in(i,j)
Node i sends requests to the neighboring nodes k to collect
their recommendations regarding node j. Indirect trust is a
distributed operation where all nodes can compute indirect
trust based on the received recommendations at time t. To
achieve an accurate result, the recommender node k should
only send its recommendation about node j if it had a
previous communication with it. To filter out the dishonest
recommendations, we propose the following steps:
1) Confidence value - C(t)(i,k): Node i computes the
confidence value for each recommender node k depending on
the global trust value T (t)g(i,k). In this case, the recommendations
which are sent by malicious nodes could be ignored. The
confidence value is computed by
C
(t)
(i,k) =

1, if T (t)g(i,k) ≥ ThC .
0.8, if ThT ≤ T (t)g(i,k) < ThC .
0, if T (t)g(i,k) < ThT .
(4)
where ThC is the confidence threshold, and ThT is the trust
threshold. As much as the value 0.8 decreases, lower weight
is given for the recommendations from trusted nodes (ThT ≤
T
(t)
g(i,k)). The impact was discussed in our previous work [20].
2) Recommendations clustering: After the node i receives
the recommendations, it will divide them into two groups
which are positive and negative recommendations. The
recommendation is considered positive when T (t)g(i,k) ≥ ThT .
Otherwise, it is considered a negative recommendation.
The proposed recommendation collection process works as
shown in Algorithm 1. The average value of the positive
recommendations is calculated using
P
(t)
(i,j) =
∑n
k=1[C
(t)
(i,k) × T (t)g(k,j)]
n
(5)
and the average value of the negative recommendations is
computed by
N
(t)
(i,j) =
∑m
k=1[C
(t)
(i,k) × T (t)g(k,j)]
m
(6)
where n and m are the number of positive and negative
recommendations respectively.
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Fig. 1: Global trust decision mapping
3) Indirect trust measure: Node i calculates the indirect
trust for node j using
T
(t)
in(i,j) = α× P (t)(i,j) + β ×N (t)(i,j) (7)
where α and β are the weights for P (t)(i,j) and N
(t)
(i,j)
respectively, and α + β = 1. An adaptive weight is applied
where α and β are computed based on the number of positive
and negative recommendations as follows
α =
n
n+m
,β =
m
n+m
. (8)
Because of the impact of confidence value (C(t)(i,k)),
receiving high number of positive recommendations from
untrusted nodes could lead to very low average positive
recommendation value. Thus, computing of indirect trust is
not only affected by the weights. Also, the indirect trust value
is weighted based on the percentage of recommenders. All
these factors have impact on indirect trust as this value could
be affected by good-mouthing and bad-mouthing attacks. The
analysis in Section IV-B on page 6 explained that few positive
recommendations from trusted nodes have an impact on the
global trust to make a correct decision.
C. Global Trust - T (t)g(i,j)
Node i is able to make a decision regarding nearby
nodes based on the global trust value. Because the vehicular
network has a dynamic topology, the node i experiences
various communication cases. Therefore, node i examines
three parameters before calculating global trust value for node
j as follows:
• New communication: which determines whether the
connection between node i and node j is for the first
time.
• Existing of recommendations: which checks whether
the neighboring nodes of node i have recommendations
regarding node j.
• Current communication: which determines if there is a
communication between node i and node j during the
current interval.
The evaluation of the global trust can be done using
Fig.1, where we consider all possible scenarios in V2X
communications as follows:
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for collecting recommendations
Input: ThT , ThC , L ← list of node i neighbors which have
a previous direct communication with node j
Output: P (t)(i,j), N
(t)
(i,j)
1: for each node L(k) do
2: if T (t)g(i,L(k)) ≥ ThC then
3: C
(t)
(i,L(k)) ← 1
4: else
5: if T (t)g(i,L(k)) ≥ ThT then
6: C
(t)
(i,L(k)) ← 0.8
7: else
8: C
(t)
(i,L(k)) ← 0
9: end if
10: end if
11: if T (t)g(L(k),j) ≥ ThT then
12: P
(t)
(i,j) ← P (t)(i,j) + (C(t)(i,L(k)) × T (t)g(L(k),j))
13: n← n+ 1
14: else
15: N
(t)
(i,j) ← N (t)(i,j) + (C(t)(i,L(k)) × T (t)g(L(k),j))
16: m← m+ 1
17: end if
18: end for
19: P
(t)
(i,j) ←
P
(t)
(i,j)
n
20: N
(t)
(i,j) ←
N
(t)
(i,j)
m
• Case 1: There is no current communication BUT there
are recommendations.
• Case 2: There are current communications AND
recommendations.
• Case 3: There is no current communication AND no
recommendations.
• Case 4: There are current communications BUT no
recommendations.
Depending on whether previous communications exist,
global trust is updated using two different methods:
1) Method 1: when node i establishes the communication
with node j for the first time. In this scenario, the current trust
is ignored because node i does not have an accurate value of
node j past behavior. Thus, we only consider the direct and
indirect trust. Global trust is measured by
T
(t)
g(i,j) =

T
(t)
in(i,j), Case 1.
w1 × T (t)in(i,j) + w2 × T (t)d(i,j), Case 2.
T
(0)
g(i,j), Case 3.
T
(t)
d(i,j), Case 4.
(9)
In case 1, we only consider indirect trust because node i
only has recommendations regarding node j. While, when
the current communication exists in case 2, node i evaluates
node j based on a weight-sum of direct and indirect trust.
In case 3, node i does not have any information about node
j. Thus, initial global trust value is used. Finally, direct
trust is only evaluated in case 4 because of lacking enough
recommendations about node j.
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2) Method 2: when node i has previous communications
with node j. Thus, node i has an updated value for past trust
of node j. In this scenario, we consider current trust when
direct trust has value. Otherwise, the past trust and indirect
trust are measured only. Global trust is computed using
T
(t)
g(i,j) =

w1 × T (t)in(i,j) + w2 × T (t)p(i,j), Case 1.
w1 × T (t)in(i,j) + w2 × T (t)c(i,j), Case 2.
T
(t)
p(i,j), Case 3.
T
(t)
c(i,j), Case 4.
(10)
where w1 and w2 are weights for indirect trust and
(direct/current or past) trust, respectively. w1 represents the
recommendation rate as follows:
RW =
0.5
Neighbors(t)
(11)
w1 = (m+ n)×RW (12)
where Neighbors(t) is the number of node i neighbors at time
t, and w2 = 1− w1. When there are no neighbouring nodes,
there is no communication established at that period with
surrounding entities. Thus, there is no need to compute the
trust value where the main aim for trust model is to evaluate
the neighbouring nodes behaviour.
Because there are recommendations regarding node j in
case 1, node i is able to compute a weighted-sum of
indirect and past trust. On the other hand, when the current
communication is established in case 2, node i can measure
current trust and indirect trust. In case 3, node i can only
compute past trust value of node j. Current trust is only
considered in case 4 when there are no recommendations
regarding node j.
D. Trust decision
Every node has a local blacklist which contains a list of
malicious nodes based on its decision. Thus, node i avoids
the communication with any node j in the blacklist. Based on
T
(t)
g(i,j), the decision is made by
Decision =
{
Trusted, if T (t)g(i,j) ≥ ThT .
Malicious, if T (t)g(i,j) < ThT .
(13)
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
A. Network specifications
In our simulations, we considered a V2X network with 24
road entities and two RSUs with parameters as shown in Table
I. As shown in Fig.2, the road entities move over an area of
900×900 m2 with various speed ranges. The road entity only
uses the multi-hop route when it is located out of the network
coverage. Therefore, computing trust value for the neighboring
nodes in this scenario is a challenge because the node does
not continuously communicate with the neighboring nodes.
In addition, the considered network has heterogeneous
nodes where the road entity is not limited to vehicles but
Road 1
Road 2
Road 3
Ro
ad
 4
Road 5
Ro
ad
 6
Footpath 1
Fo
ot
pa
th
 2
Footpath 3
Fo
ot
pa
th
 4
Fig. 2: Simulation area
TABLE I: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation time (T) 80 iteration
Simulation area 900 × 900
Number of nodes 24
ThT 0.5
ThC 0.8
T
(0)
g(i,j)
0.5
TABLE II: Mobility Parameters
Road entity speed range (mph)
Vehicle 10-30
Pedestrian 0-8
Cycle 3-10
Motorcycle 10-30
also includes pedestrian, motorcycles and cycles with various
speeds as shown in TABLE II. Thus, the connection time could
vary depending on the speed of source and destination nodes.
To measure the performance of the proposed trust model.
We studied four malicious behaviors: blackhole attack,
greyhole attack, bad mouthing attack and good mouthing
attack.
B. Results
1) Network Performance: The performance of the entire
network is represented by two parameters, which are PDR
and network throughput, in the presence of malicious nodes.
Network throughput is measured by the percentage of packets
that are sent successfully. It is calculated using
Network_Throughput =
SP
TP
(14)
where SP is the number of packets that are successfully
sent and TP is the total number of generated packets in the
network.
In Fig.3 (a), the PDR keeps increasing until reach
approximately 0.4 in the worst case when malicious node
percentage is more than or equal to 87.50% and all malicious
nodes are blackhole attackers where they drop all of the
received packets. On the other hand, in the greyhole attack,
the dropping rate also increases but at a lower rate.
Moreover, we measured the network throughput as shown
in Fig.3 (b) and we notice that our model, in case of greyhole
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Fig. 3: Network Performance in the presence of malicious nodes: a) Packet Dropping Rate; b) Network throughput
attack, can keep the value of throughput greater than 0.7 even
in case of the high percentage of malicious nodes. While in the
blackhole attack, the network performance decreases to reach
0.65 in the worst case.
2) Detection Rate for Blackhole/Greyhole attackers:
Blackhole attack is easier to detect than greyhole attack
because the malicious node drops all of the received packets.
In Fig.4, we see that the trust value starts with the initial value
which is equal to 0.5. In blackhole attack, at the first intervals
when the malicious behavior is launched, the trust value drops
to 0.08 which is a little value; then, trust value gradually
decreases with time. In the greyhole attack, during the first
intervals, trust value increases because of a low dropping rate;
then, trust value goes down because of the impact of the
received recommendations.
3) Analysis for minimum required trustworthy neighbors:
As indirect trust is evaluated based on neighboring nodes’
recommendations, we analyse the minimum number of
trustworthy neighbors to make correct decisions. Also, the
existing of recommendation attackers could disturb the trust
decisions. In Fig. 5, we present the global trust values in
the proposed four cases when indirect trust is calculated
(case 1 and case 2 in both methods). In this scenario,
the node i evaluates node j (normal node). Then, trusted
neighboring nodes s send good recommendations regarding
node j (T (t)g(s,j) ≥ 0.6). However, untrusted nodes k send bad
recommendations regarding node j to disturb the decision
(T (t)g(s,j) < 0.5). As the node j is a normal node, then
(T (t)p(i,j) ≥ 0.5, T (t)d(i,j) ≥ 0.8). Generally, we notice that the
minimum number of neighboring trusted nodes is around 30%
of the recommenders to be able to make correct decisions
with the existing of recommendation attackers. The following
remarks are concluded:
• In case 1-method 1, the global trust is very low and
affected by the received recommendations where indirect
trust is only considered. The global trust value is above
the trust threshold when the percentage of trusted nodes
is above 60%.
• In case 1- method 2, the trust value is higher than the
previous case because of the impact of past trust in
the weighted-sum equation. The value is above the trust
threshold when the percentage of trusted nodes is higher
than 30%.
• In case 2 – method 1, the global trust records the highest
value because the equation is a weighted-sum of direct
and indirect trust values. As the direct trust is based on the
direct experience, then, the normal node j has a very high
value. Thus, the global trust is above the trust threshold
when the percentage of trusted nodes is higher than 10%.
• In case 2 – method 2, the global trust is affected by the
indirect and current trust (a combination of direct and
past trust). Thus, the global trust value goes above the
trust threshold when the percentage of trusted nodes is
above 20%.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We use the recommendation-based trust model in [14] as a
benchmark to evaluate the performance of the proposed model.
The model in [14] considered two trust components which are
direct and indirect to filter out bogus recommendations. Total
trust is computed by
Tij = wd × T dij + wi × T iij (15)
where T dij is direct trust, T
i
ij is indirect trust. wd and wi are
the weights for direct and indirect trust respectively, and wd+
wd = 1.
A. Case study 1: Detecting non-stable malicious behavior
Malicious nodes can escape the punishment by stopping its
malicious behavior for a while. As a consequence, we measure
the ability of malicious node to return after a period of time
t as a normal node.
Statement 1. Higher detection rate for non-stable malicious
nodes in the proposed model than the existing one.
Proof. The existing model applied decay factor (µ) on the
number of interactions between node i and node j. The
number of positive and negative interactions decreased with
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Fig. 4: Trust values for various malicious attacks
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Fig. 5: Analysis for minimum required trustworthy neighbors
for make a correct decision regarding normal node j
time when there is no interaction between them as shown
in Fig.6. We notice that the number of positive and negative
interactions is increased as long as there is a communication
between the two nodes. Otherwise, the number of interactions
is decreased because of applying the following computation
ρ = ρold × µ, η = ηold × µ
where ρ and η are the number of positive and negative
interactions respectively, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. On the other hand, in
the Proposed model, the global trust always considers past trust
when there is a previous communication with the considered
node j as shown in eq.(10). In this case, even if the malicious
node leaves the area for a while to wash its past behavior. Our
proposed model is able to remember its past behavior.
B. Case study 2: Rejecting recommendations from malicious
recommenders
In this case, we study the ability of node i to ignore the
recommendations which are sent by malicious nodes.
Statement 2. The proposed trust model is able to reject the
recommendations from malicious nodes.
Proof. In the existing model, we evaluate the ability of the
existing model to ignore the recommendations from malicious
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Fig. 6: Effect of decay factor
nodes. The model applied various conditions on the collected
recommendations, however, we show that the node may count
recommendations from malicious nodes.
First condition is based on the confidence value which is
computed by
V confik = 1−
√
12δikγik
(δik+γik)2(δik+γik+1)
where δik is the accumulative positive interactions between
node i and node k, and γik is the accumulative negative
interactions between node i and node k. They are computed
using
δik = ρ+ 1, γik = η + 1
Because the multiplication and summation are reversible
operations. Therefore, V conf1if = V
conf2
if where
V conf1if when δ > γ and V
conf2
if when γ > δ
Then, the confidence value is increased when total number
of interactions is increased either positive or negative
interactions.
Moreover, the second condition is based on deviation value
as follows:
|T di,j − T dk,j | ≤ 0.5
For example, if node j is a trusted node where (T di,j = 1).
However, node k sends bad recommendation about normal
node j where (T dk,j = 0.5). In this case, the deviation condition
is achieved and this recommendation is accepted.
On the other hand, in the proposed model, during the
recommendation collection phase, the node i applies the
following conditions on the recommending node k. Thus, if
the node k is malicious node, the confidence value C(t)(i,k) is
equal to zero and its recommendation is ignored as shown in
eq.(4).
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Fig. 7: False Negative Rate
C. Case study 3: The road entity travels to a new region
In this case, we evaluate the model when the road entity
moves from its current location to a new region where there
is no previous information about any road entity. We study the
ability of the proposed model to make a decision in this case.
Statement 3. The ability of detecting malicious node, when
the road entity travels to a new area, in the proposed model
is better than the existing model.
Proof. In the existing model, the confidence value will be zero
for all recommending nodes because the confidence value for
them will be as follows.
ρ = 0, η = 0
δik = ρ+ 1 = 1, γik = η + 1 = 1 ⇒ V confif = 0
The algorithm cannot establish trustworthy cluster of
recommendations. Therefore, the recommendation system fails
and total trust cannot be calculated. If we assume that the
model can compute total trust based on the direct trust only,
thus, T ti,j = 0.5. Therefore, node j is always considered a
trusted node because the trust threshold in the existing model
is equal to 0.4.
On the other hand, in the proposed model, when no previous
interactions between node i and node j, we consider the
following information:
• T (t)global(i,j) = T
(t)
indirect(i,j);
• C(t)(i,k) = 0.8 because T
(t)
global(i,k) = 0.5 which is the initial
value;
We use this information to evaluate the ability of normal
node to detect malicious node in a new region.
α× P (t)(i,j) + β ×N (t)(i,j) ≥ 0.5
α× P (t)(i,j) ≥ 0.5− β ×N (t)(i,j)
α ≥ 0.8−β×N
(t)
(i,j)
P
(t)
(i,j)
, where β ×N (t)(i,j) < 0.5
The node is trusted only if the value of α is located in the
valid range.
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VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation of Trust Model Performance
1) False Negative Rate: which is the rate of undetected
malicious nodes. As much as the model has a low false
negative rate, the impact of malicious nodes is minimal. High
false negative rate means that the malicious node stays in the
network for a long time without being detected. The result that
is shown in Fig.7 represents the false negative rate for various
percentages of malicious nodes. The following remarks can be
made:
• in the existing model, as the percentage of malicious
nodes increases, false negative rate rises significantly.
• In comparison with the existing model, the false negative
rate is increased slightly in our model. Thus, the
malicious node is detected faster in our model than the
existing one.
• when the percentage of malicious nodes is high, the false
negative rate in the proposed model is still lower than
0.4.
2) Recommendation Usage Rate: is critical in the vehicular
network because of the high chance of meeting a new entity.
Thus, when the vehicle does not have enough information
about the new entity, it leads to wrong decisions. The received
recommendations could minimize the incorrect decisions.
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Fig. 10: Improvement Rate in PDR
As a result of the recommendation attacks, the node has
to check the trustworthiness of the recommendation source.
The node only accepts the recommendations from trusted
neighbors. Recommendation usage rate is calculated using
Recommendation_Rate =
Count_Recommendations
Total_Calculations
(16)
where Count_Recommendations is the times of
using recommendations in trust calculations and
Total_Calculations is the total number of trust calculations.
On the other hand, the existing model [14] applied strict
conditions for taking the recommendations which lead
to ignore the most of recommendations. Therefore, the
recommendation usage rate in the existing model is less
than the proposed one as shown in Fig.8, which means
that the existing model does not take advantage of using
recommendation as much as the proposed model.
3) Prediction Rate: is the rate of avoiding the first
communication with malicious nodes. When the node moves
to a new location, it needs for the recommendations from
the neighboring nodes to have awareness regarding the
neighboring malicious nodes and avoid the communication
with them. As a result of the high recommendation usage rate
in the proposed model, the nodes are able to predict and detect
malicious nodes before communicating with them as shown in
Fig.9. Thus, it improves the network performance.
B. Evaluation of Network Performance
The performance of the entire network is represented by
PDR and network throughput in the presence of malicious
nodes. PDR is evaluated to see the impact of such attacks
with and without trust models as shown in Fig.10. We notice
that the PDR in the proposed model is low in comparison with
the network without defence. This clarifies the improvement of
the proposed model in the network performance. In addition,
the PDR improvement rate in the existing model [18], which
applies fuzzy logic method, is very close to the proposed
model. On the other hand, PDR for the existing model [14] is
very close to the network without defence. Thus, it has a low
improvement rate. In addition, PDR in the proposed model
Fig. 11: Improvement Rate in Network Throughput
is improved to reach 85% when the percentage of malicious
nodes is less than or equal to 12.5%.
Moreover, network throughput is measured with and without
trust models as shown in Fig.11. We notice that the network
throughput in the existing model [18] is very close to the
proposed model, however, the proposed model is the highest
which leads to an improvement in the network performance.
On the other hand, the network throughput for the existing
model [14] is very close to the network without defence. In
addition, the improvement rate in network throughput in the
proposed model is increased when the percentage of malicious
nodes is increased.
C. Performance Comparison for Stable malicious behavior
The model performance is studied in the case of stable
malicious nodes. From Fig.12 (a), we notice that the trust
values are volatile because of the effect of the decay factor. As
the number of positive interactions is increased, the trust value
rises. In case of no communications for a period, the number
of interactions decreases. Thus, the malicious node can return
after a while as a normal node, where the trust threshold in
the existing mode is equal to 0.4.
On the other hand, we notice that trust value in the proposed
model is more consistent than the existing model as shown in
Fig.12 (b). At the beginning, the value increases because of
the behavior of greyhole attacker. Then, it gradually decreases
over the time because when no communication is established
for a period, the number of interactions is zero. Thus, the
trust value is computed based on the past trust and the
recommendations values.
D. Performance Comparison for Non-Stable malicious
behavior
We study the model performance with the existing of non-
stable malicious nodes. From the result in Fig.13 we can
conclude the following:
• in Fig. 13 (a), the malicious node behaves normally
between 1-15 time intervals. We notice that the trust
value is increased during these intervals in both models.
After the 15th interval, the trust value drops in the
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(a) Existing model [14]
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Fig. 12: Performance Comparison for Stable malicious behavior: a) Existing model [14]; b) Proposed model
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Fig. 13: Performance Comparison for Non-Stable malicious behavior
proposed model more than the existing model. The reason
for non-steady trust values before the 15th interval is
the effect of the recommendations. If the node receives
recommendations regarding the malicious node, the trust
value goes down. Otherwise, the trust value only depends
on the direct experience which means high trust value.
• in Fig. 13 (b), the malicious node behaves normally
between 15-35 time intervals. We notice that the normal
behavior of the malicious node does not affect the trust
value in the proposed model. The reason for that is the
impact of past behavior on the trust value. On the other
hand, in the existing model, the trust value is gradually
increased after 15th interval because of many reasons
which are low recommendation usage rate and the impact
of the decay factor.
• in Fig. 13 (c), the malicious node behaves normally
between 35-53 time intervals. We also notice that the trust
value in the proposed model is not affected. However, the
trust value is gradually increased after the 35th interval,
but it is in a lower value than the previous case.
• in conclusion, our model is less affected by non-stable
malicious behavior than the existing model.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a recommendation-based
trust model for the V2X network. We conducted various
experiments to study the performance of the proposed
model. In addition, we considered different malicious attacks
which are blackhole attack, greyhole attack, bad mouthing
attack and good mouthing attack. Simulation results showed
that the proposed model surpasses the existing model. A
comparison result showed that our model improves the
network performance with 36% when the percentage of
malicious nodes is equal to 87.5%. In future work, we will
apply the proposed model on a realistic mobility model and
compare the results. Also, as autonomous connected vehicles
are exposed to physical and cyber attacks [21], we will apply
the model on an intra-vehicle communications to protect the
sensors.
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